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Abstract
Is corruption capable of spreading across national borders? This paper uses panel
data for 120 countries from 1995 to 2012 to evaluate whether the corruption levels of
neighboring countries, as weighted by the relative joint border length, affects domes-
tic corruption. Including country fixed effects allows us to control for unobservable
country specific aspects and our results suggest a positive and statistically significant
relationship. In general, a ten point increase in the weighted freedom from corruption
index of neighboring countries is associated with a one point increase of the domes-
tic freedom from corruption index. This result is robust to a variety of alternative
specifications, such as a GMM estimation or including additional control variables.
The proposed effect becomes stronger as income increases and the relationship is only
positive for countries with a GDP per capita above US$1,600 (in 2000 US$). For the
richest countries, the estimated coefficient rises up to 0.43.
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1 Introduction
Neighborhood effects have long been recognized in numerous fields of economics and recently
the literature on corruption determinants has caught on. As a variety of cultural aspects
do not necessarily recognize national borders, this may also hold for corruption. With the
annual costs of corruption estimated to equal 5% of global GDP (US$ 2.6 trillion), it is
vital to understand how corruption can be influenced.1 Thus, if we had convincing evidence
for neighborhood effects across national borders, the gains from policies fighting corruption
become a new dimension. Recently, Becker et al. (2009) found spillover effects for corruption
in cross country studies. Ma´rquez et al. (2011) on the other hand conclude that neighboring
countries simply show similar characteristics and corruption does not vary with the behaviour
of adjoining countries. Thus, the major studies on neighborhood effects in corruption across
national borders have not reached a consensus.
The following pages revisit the relationship between the corruption levels of neighboring
countries and domestic corruption levels in a panel setting. Becker et al. (2009) and Ma´rquez
et al. (2011) use one observation per country in their studies. The main downfall of using a
pure cross-sectional study is that one cannot control for unobservable country-specific aspects
(see conclusion of Treisman, 2000). However, given unique historical, cultural, and regional
characteristics of every single country, this distinction can be important in the context of
corruption determinants. The advantages of using panel data with fixed effects have been
shown in several macroeconomic topics lately (e.g., for goverment size and openness by Ram,
2009).
Another extension of this paper consists in the number of observations. The mentioned
reference papers use 120, 123, and 171 observations, whereas we are able to incorporate over
1,600 annual observations from 120 countries. As Becker et al. (2009) and Ma´rquez et al.
(2011) focus on using values averaged over several years (due to the spatial econometric
approach), their analyses highlight the mid- to long-term aspect of corruption determinants.
However, corruption data shows substantial year-to-year variation within countries. On
average, the yearly absolute change in the freedom from corruption index (FFC ) lies at 2.69
points on a scale from 0-100. Further, these changes do not appear to be deviations around
a time-invariant country-specific mean. The average absolute difference between the earliest
1Estimate from OECD (2013). World Bank president Jim Yong Kim recently labeled corruption “public
enemy number one” (World Bank, 2013).
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and the most recent observation of a country amounts to 12.69 points on the FFC scale
in our sample. Thus, using annual observations allows us to capture these within-country
variations in corruption levels.
The following section briefly describes our methodology and the data used. Section 3
explains our findings and section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology and Data
In order to test potential neighborhood effects of corruption across countries, we use an OLS
regression framework, estimating country i’s corruption level in year t as:
FFCit = α0 + α1NCIit + α2X it + α3Zi + it. (1)
We choose the FFC as our dependent variable, provided by the Heritage Foundation, which
ranges from 0 (totally corrupt) to 100 (absolute freedom from corruption). The index is
available for the years 1995 to 2012, depending on the country, and is mainly built on the
Corruption Perceptions Index. Notice that higher values indicate less corruption. The FFC
is mostly built on the Corruptions Perception Index (CPI) and the correlation between the
two is almost perfect (0.968). Unlike other corruption indices, the CPI – and thus the FFC
– incorporates information from both private risk assessments and surveys and has therefore
been preferred recently (see Serra, 2006, p. 229, for a deeper discussion). Beyond that, the
FFC is highly correlated to the Control of Corruption index from the World Bank (0.954).
Our measurement for corruption levels in neighboring countries is the N eighbors’ Corruption
Index (NCIit), which will be explained in detail below. Xit contains control variables
previously found important in determining corruption levels, including GDP per capita
(lngdpcap), population size (lnpop), government size (gov), urbanization (urban), imports
(lnimp), and the duration of secondary education (edu).3 We choose the length of secondary
education as representative for an educational measurement because of data availability
Additional information is derived from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Commercial Guide,
2008 - 2011; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce and Country Report, 2008 - 2011; Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, 2011 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers; and official
government publications of each country. Also see Heritage (2013).
3 Variables beginning with ln imply the application of the natural logarithm, as is common for these
variables.
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throughout the sample period. All the above variables have been consistently found to in-
fluence corruption levels in the associated literature (e.g., see Treisman, 2000, Fisman and
Gatti, 2002, or Billger and Goel, 2009). Table 1 displays summary statistics and sources.
Table 1: Summary statistics.
Variable N Mean Min. Description Source
(Std.
Dev.)
(Max.)
FFC 1,627 43
(24.0)
4
(100)
Freedom from corruption, rang-
ing from 0− 100
Index of Economic
Freedom
NCI 1,627 40.4
(19.4)
5
(93.5)
Average FFC score of neighbor-
ing countries, weighted by shared
border length
Derived from Index of
Economic Freedom and
the CIA World Factbook
lngdpcap 1,627 8.2
(1.6)
5.0
(11.4)
Natural logarithm of GDP per
capita (constant 2000 US$)
World Bank
lnpop 1,627 16.1
(1.4)
12.2
(19.6)
Natural logarithm of total popu-
lation
World Bank
gov 1,627 15.8
(6.1)
2.0
(39.5)
General government final con-
sumption expenditure (% of
GDP)
World Bank
urban 1,627 59.5
(22.1)
7.6
(100)
Urbanization rate World Bank
lnimp 1,627 3.7
(0.5)
2.124
(5.4)
Natural logarithm of imports of
goods and services (% of GDP)
World Bank
edu 1,627 5.6
(1)
3
(8)
Secondary education, duration
years
World Bank
freepress 1.5 43.4
(23.0)
5
(99)
Freedom of the press, ranging
from 0 − 100
Freedom House
lntrade 1.6 4.4
(0.5)
2.7
(6.1)
Natural logarithm of exports
plus imports (% of GDP)
World Bank
Further, Zi contains country fixed effects, incorporating any time-invariant aspects of a
country. This covers other important corruption determinants, which have been pointed out,
such as colony status, legal system, degrees of latitude from the equator, or federal structure
(See Treisman, 2000, and Serra, 2006). It also reasonably controls for country characteristics,
which only change slowly over time, such as religious or ethnic fractionalization (Dincer,
2008) or the share of protestants in society (e.g., Fan et al., 2009).
NCIit stands for our measurement of the neighboring countries’ corruption levels. We
use information about the length of shared borders (in kilometers) from the CIA World
Factbook (CIA, 2013) to construct the average corruption score of all neighboring countries,
weighted by the length of the common land border. For a total border length of totalborderi
of country i and a common border of length commonborderij with country j, the index
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becomes
NCIit =
k∑
j=1
commonborderij
totalborderi
FFCjt, (2)
assuming k neighboring countries of country i. Finally, we exclude islands from the analysis,
as we only consider land borders. During our analysis, we also tested for additional spatial
autocorrelation (Moran’s I test), employing a weighted spatial matrix (Jeanty, 2010). Using
a balanced panel from 2001 – 2010 (the test requires a balanced panel) then reveals that
we fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero spatial dependence at the 5 percent significance
level. Thus, it is unlikely that additional spatial attributes are confounding our analysis.
3 Empirical Findings
Table 2 displays our main results from estimating the effect of NCIit on domestic corruption
levels, subsequently including control variables. In order to facilitate comparability, all
regressions use observations where all explanatory variables are available.
Column (1) only incorporates the NCI as a regressor and we already note an intimate
relationship between the two variables. Including country dummies and GDP per capita then
highlights the crucial importance of fixed effects, as the Hausman test clearly recommends
using fixed effects over random effects. This means that country-specific unobservables,
such as cultural, historic, or geographic differences are important in determining corruption
levels. The coefficient associated with the NCI remains significant, suggesting a positive
relationship between domestic corruption and corruption in neighboring countries. Moving
from column (3) to (5), we add the remaining explanatory variables from equation 1. In
terms of our main variable of interest, the NCI remains significant, mostly on the five
percent level, and settles around a magnitude of 0.1. This means that a rise of the NCI by
ten points (say from 60 to 70) would lead to a rise in the domestic FFC index by one point
(say from 60 to 61).
With respect to the remaining control variables, we mostly confirm the existing literature.
A higher GDP per capita and more education is associated with less corruption. The non-
significance of government size could potentially be explained by using annual data, as the
low year-to-year variation in government size may not be strong enough to reveal a potential
We also tested for the presence of a nonlinear relationship, including a squared and a cubed term, but
none of these ever reach conventional significance levels.
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Table 2: OLS results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: FFC
NCI 0.86∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.232)
lngdpcap 4.41∗∗∗ 4.85∗∗∗ 5.64∗∗∗ 3.54∗∗ 0.47
(1.215) (1.351) (1.363) (1.385) (1.596)
lnpop -2.39 0.38 1.05 5.49
(3.077) (4.022) (3.946) (3.983)
gov 0.14 0.10 0.10
(0.105) (0.103) (0.103)
urban -0.25∗ -0.22 -0.34∗∗
(0.150) (0.151) (0.151)
lnimp 0.58 0.11 0.11
(1.299) (1.275) (1.271)
edu 4.26∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗
(0.804) (0.781)
NCI × lngdpcap 0.11∗∗∗
(0.028)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Chi2 value of Hausman testa 32.05∗∗∗ 33.16∗∗∗ 36.64∗∗∗ 55.16∗∗∗ 51.54∗∗∗
N 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627
# of Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120
adj. R2 0.486 0.912 0.913 0.913 0.915 0.916
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
aTesting for fixed versus random effects.
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relationship. Interestingly, the suggested coefficient is positive, confirming previous findings
by Billger and Goel (2009).
Finally, column (6) introduces an interaction term between the NCI and GDP per capita.
As the suggested effect of the NCI on FFC is positive, we also wish to examine whether
this effect changes along the lines of other factors. Interestingly, the effect does not vary
with the size of international trade or other variables identifying interaction with foreign
countries, such as the size of imports, foreign direct investment levels, or common languages.
However, richer countries seem to experience a stronger relationship between neighboring
and domestic corruption. Column (6) suggests that the positive effect of NCI on FFC sets
in for countries with a GDP per capita over about US$1,600 (lngdpcap = 7.38). In 2012,
this threshold level roughly corresponds to countries like Honduras, Mongolia, or Paraguay.
One possible reason for this finding is that people may become aware of what happens in
surrounding countries as their standard of living rises. For instance, the poorest nations
may have neither the opportunity (television, radio etc.) nor the interest in what happens
in neighboring countries, simply because they are too worried about their own survival. As
income increases, so does the awareness of one’s surroundings. However, this interpretation
is of course purely speculative.
Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of NCI on FFC at different levels of GDP, repre-
senting four sample countries in 2012. A circle in the graph marks the respective country’s
NCI score in 2012. In the first graph we notice a country whose GDP level is not high
enough to offset the NCI effect, causing a negative slope. Thus, an improved NCI would
theoretically generate an increase in levels of corruption, although the effect is far from being
significant at this level. However, as we gradually increase development levels over Ecuador
and Hungary to Luxembourg, the net effect becomes stronger and neighbors matter more.
Although speculative, if Hungary had Luxembourg’s neighbors, their FFC level would rise
by almost 10 points.
4 Robustness Checks
Table 3 tests the validity of our main results, using specification (5) of table 2 as a reference
point. First, we include an indicator for press freedom and consider a different measurement
The threshold is determined by
∂freecorr
∂NCI
= −0.78 + 0.11× lngdpcap = 0.
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of NCI on FFC
for trade. We then move to including an overall time trend and time fixed effects. Finally, the
last two columns consider a balanced data set and address potential endogeneity problems
by applying a GMM estimator.
First, we follow Brunetti and Weder (2003) by including an indicator for press freedom,
provided by Freedom House. We do not include freepress in the main regressions, because
we lose observations and, as column (1) in table 3 shows, it does not affect the coefficient of
NCI in a notable way. As with government size, it may be that press freedom moves slowly
over time and we therefore do not find a significant effect on corruption levels. Column (2)
then includes international trade instead of just imports. Although the majority of papers
on corruption determinants employ imports (Treisman, 2000, Fisman and Gatti, 2002, or
Fan et al., 2009), other studies use total trade as a fraction of GDP, such as Sandholtz and
Koetzle (2000) or Knack and Azfar (2003). With respect to the NCI, column (2) shows
that our results do not depend on which trade measure is used.
Further, including a general time trend or time fixed effects generates similar results
for the coefficient associated with the NCI. Even with the restrictive framework of two-
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Table 3: Robustness checks.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Balanced GMM
2001 – 2010a
Dependent variable: FFC
NCI 0.11∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.26***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.072) (0.069)
lngdpcap 3.16∗∗ 3.34∗∗ 3.98∗∗ 4.01∗∗ 2.31 9.45∗∗∗
(1.446) (1.378) (1.698) (1.758) (1.751) (1.362)
lnpop 0.90 0.60 1.69 1.08 -5.19 -2.46∗∗∗
(4.147) (3.949) (4.188) (4.175) (4.638) (0.350)
gov 0.19∗∗ 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.36∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(0.092) (0.102) (0.103) (0.108) (0.119) (0.183)
urban -0.20 -0.22 -0.20 -0.19 -0.01 -0.07
(0.159) (0.150) (0.173) (0.171) (0.214) (0.081)
edu 4.58∗∗∗ 4.24∗∗∗ 4.28∗∗∗ 4.32∗∗∗ 3.61∗∗∗ 1.90∗∗∗
(0.832) (0.804) (0.811) (0.794) (0.963) (0.693)
lnimp -0.73 0.30 0.53 1.19 -5.21∗∗∗
(1.323) (1.320) (1.410) ( 1.434) (1.287)
freepress -0.00
(0.038)
lntrade 1.17
(1.424)
year -0.04
(0.096)
Time fixed effects yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1,541 1,627 1,627 1,627 944 1,506
# of Countries 118 120 120 120 110 119
adj. R2 0.914 0.915 0.915 0.914 0.955 0.677
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
aOnly using countries for which all variables are available for all years between 2001 – 2010.
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way fixed effects, the NCI remains significant with its magnitude only decreasing marginally.
Column (5) then considers a balanced panel, as we want to make sure that our results are not
driven by outliers or countries with fewer observations. Even though country fixed effects
should control for this in the main analysis, this may serve as a useful robustness check,
since countries with consecutive observations for all variables from 2001 – 2010 provide more
consistency. The significant results from table 2 hold, but now government size is significant,
which means an increase in government expenditure causes a reduction in corruption levels
(confirming results from Fisman and Gatti, 2002, or Billger and Goel, 2009).
Finally, column (6) uses a generalized method of moments estimator (GMM), addressing
potential problems stemming from endogeneity. In the context of the NCI, domestic cor-
ruption levels can be affected by neighboring corruption levels or vice versa. In the context
of other variables, such as GDP per capita, it has been shown that corruption levels also
affect development levels (see Mauro, 1995, and Treisman, 2000). The instruments used in
this specification are values lagged by one year of all variables, except population size, since
past observations are unlikely to be a consequence of present observations. The results from
GMM estimations then show that the effect of all variables is significant, except for the
coefficient associated with the urbanization rate. Overall, the results displayed in table 3
support our main findings.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses whether corruption in neighboring countries can affect domestic corrup-
tion levels, using panel data for 120 countries from 1995 – 2012. Our contribution lies in
accounting for country fixed effects and in using a sizeable data set (over 1,600 observations
as opposed to between 120 and 171 in reference papers). Both extensions are possible by
using annual and newly available data.
Our findings suggest a positive and significant relationship between the level of corruption
in neighboring countries and domestic corruption levels, confirming findings by Becker et al.
(2009). Our most complete specification suggests a coefficient of 0.1, taking into account
the most persistent control variables found in the literature. This means that an increase in
the FFC index in neighboring countries (as weighted by their relative shared border) by ten
The GMM results also remain robust to using values lagged by two, five, or ten years.
9
points, say from 60 to 70 on a scale from 0 to 100, would be associated with a rise in the
domestic FFC index by 1 point.
Finally, this finding varies across income levels. Specifically, the relationship is only found
to be positive for countries with income levels over US$ 1,600 (in constant 2000 US$). Above
that level, the effect increases with income. Intuitively, this could mean that citizens of poor
countries are either not aware of many aspects in neighboring countries (lack of radio, news
outlets, television) or simply have to meet basic needs, so any interactions with neighboring
countries are limited. For the richest country in our sample (Luxembourg with a GDP per
capita of US$ 87,716), the effect rises up to 0.43.
In terms of policy relevance, these findings suggest that activities aimed at reducing
corruption levels within one country may well spill over into neighboring countries, thus
producing a positive externality. Given our analysis of yearly observations, this contagion
effect may happen quicker as previously thought.
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